A Freezing Moment in Ghana's Party System:

How Two Thorns in Nkrumah's Side Framed Elections in the Fourth Republic

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ABSTRACT Ghanaian elections in the Fourth Republic demonstrate clear regional patterns. The National Democratic Congress (NDC) wins the vast majority of the vote in Volta Region, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) earns its largest victories in Asante Region, and the remaining eight regions are more competitive. This article explores the genesis of these patterns and finds that they first revealed themselves in Ghana's Second Republic when two ethnopolitical groups who had fought Nkrumah's nationalizing efforts took advantage of their organizational capacities. They adopted the ideological labels of the First Republic to fill the political vacuum left by the departure of the country's popular independence leader. This nuanced reading of Ghana's partisan history stands in contrast to both popular contemporary accounts and predictions raised in the literature on the creation of party systems.

RÉSUMÉ Les élections ghanéennes sous la IVe République montrent des schémas régionaux clairs. Le Congrès national démocratique (NDC) remporte la majorité des voix dans la région de la Volta, la Nouveau Parti patriotique (NPP) remporte ses plus grandes victoires dans la région d'Asante et les huit régions restantes sont plus compétitives. Cet article explore la genèse de ces modèles et constate qu'ils se sont d'abord révélés dans la deuxième République du Ghana lorsque deux

groupes ethno-politiques qui avaient combattu les efforts de nationalisation de Nkrumah ont tiré profit de leurs capacités organisationnelles de ces derniers. Ils ont repris à leur compte les idéologies de la Première République pour combler le vide politique laissé par le départ du leader indépendantiste du pays. Cette lecture nuancée de l'histoire partisane du Ghana contraste avec les récits et prédictions populaires contemporains soulevés dans la littérature sur la création des systèmes de partis.

When Ghanaians went to the polls on December 7, 2016, to give President Nana Akufo-Addo a decisive victory and return his New Patriotic Party (NPP) to the majority of seats in Parliament, the outcome of the Fourth Republic's seventh set of national elections was uncertain. John Mahama was a sitting president and no sitting president had ever been evicted from office before his life or constitutional mandate had expired. Mahama's most significant challenger, Akufo-Addo, is a veteran politician who claims a father and two uncles among Ghana's "Big Six" and his NPP was only eight years removed from government. Because Ghana's two dominant political parties each present viable governing options, quadrennial elections are hotly contested and anxiety-inducing affairs and 2016 was no exception. It was not until the evening of December 9, 2016 that the newly minted electoral commissioner, Charlotte Osei, was able to make an announcement that sent NPP supporters into the streets in jubilation and left National Democratic Congress (NDC) partisans to reminisce of days gone by and stew on their future ambitions.

Though the final outcome of the election was the subject of much uncertainty prior to voting, there are patterns in Ghana's 2016 elections that even a casual observer of the country's politics could accurately predict well before voters ventured to their polling stations. Since the inauguration of the Fourth Republic, the "social democratic" NDC had won overwhelmingly in constituencies in the southern half of Volta Region. The focal point of support for the center-right NPP converges on Kumasi and its environs in Asante Region. The rest of Ghana is more competitive, especially the further one moves geographically and culturally from these two political poles. Even controlling for a number of ideologically tinged socioeconomic and ethnolinguistic variables in Fourth Republican elections, the presence of Akan-speakers from the Asante Region in the case of the NPP and Ewé-speakers in the case of the NDC remain highly significant predictors of positive support.[1]

To graphically display these patterns, Figure 1 depicts the median electoral success for each of Ghana's two dominant parties over seven presidential elections (1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016). Using 1992 district boundaries and aggregating up for recent elections, each district is shown as either white (the party received very few votes), black (the party scored nearly all votes), or

a shade of gray (the party neither dominated nor was dominated at the polls). These maps, with only minor adjustments, could describe any Fourth Republican presidential election. The shades of grey only deepen or lighten slightly when the party in opposition wins.[2] Although quite a bit of scholarly effort has been spent trying to explain the ethnopolitical and socioeconomic foundations of these patterns using contemporary data, the fact that the politicized cleavages undergirding these patterns were manifesting themselves in elections long before 1992 has largely been ignored.[3] This article fills the lacuna with a careful and systematic reading of Ghana's partisan history.

This careful reading of election results and the historical record seeks answers to two questions fundamental to party system formation.[4] When were the "freezing moments" in Ghanaian party history that created the contemporary electoral status quo? What political processes and social structures precipitated and shaped the characteristics of this particular "frozen" system instead of one built upon countless other social cleavages? This article concludes that Ghana's contemporary party system began with the overthrow of the country's first president


FIGURE 1.
Median first round presidential vote (1992–2016) percentage across 1992 (N = 110) districts.

in 1966. It was then that the two best organized opposition groups, one based in Asante and the other in Ewéland, had room to grow as political movements and tie themselves to proto-ideological parties. Their rise to the fore was anything but a foregone conclusion. Events that are likely not to be replicated elsewhere in quite the same manner formed and sustained these movements through the present where they have become such a staple of the Ghanaian party system it is implausible to imagine a time in the near future where political actors will not find these social cleavages useful organizational tools.

Methodological Options

The nature of these questions and available data foreclose a number of powerful methodological tools. Surveys administered across time allow one to track changing attitudes of social groups to isolate freezing moments. Unfortunately, widespread use of surveys is relatively new to the continent. Regular interviews conducted over the years can serve a similar purpose. Once freezing moments are isolated, interviews done in years past can shed light on the processes behind this freezing. These interviews would allow one to query voters' motives for reconfirming the status quo or sparking alterations without the illusory effects of time. Over the years several scholars have produced interesting descriptive texts informed by interviews, but the bulk of these works address the social foundations of party politics only tangentially, if at all.[5]

In lieu of these precluded paths, we turn to existing aggregate data. To isolate the "freezing moment" in the Asante/Ewé cleavage and reveal alternative social cleavages that have in the past been politically mobilized, pre-Fourth Republican election results are mined in two complementary fashions.[6] Using constituency maps shaded with electoral data, areas of strong, moderate, and weak support for pre-Fourth Republican parties are displayed (see Figures 2 and 3). This presentation allows one to highlight geographic blocs that strongly support parties across the historical landscape and identify the point when familiar electoral patterns emerge. The second depiction of election results presents regional results along with rudimentary regression analysis using census data to predict voting behavior across electoral units (see Tables 1–4).[7] Together the election maps and census data pinpoint periods of stasis and change in the relationship between political parties and geographically based social cleavages.

With periods of "freezing" identified, the burden of reading history persists. Knowing what cleavages are important and when they became politically salient is only the start of a project meant to identify the social and political ingredients that generated a freezing moment. Having identified a freezing moment, the task

TABLE1. 1954 LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY ELECTION RESULTS BY REGION AND ETHNOCULTURAL GROUP

	CPP	CPP$_{reb}$	GCP	TC	AYO	NoPP	MAP	GNP
Western	74.4%	17.5%	00.8%	00.0%	00.0%	00.0%	00.2%	00.0%
Central	68.3%	21.5%	05.9%	00.0%	00.0%	00.0%	00.3%	00.0%
Greater Accra	78.7%	02.2%	02.9%	00.0%	00.0%	00.0%	05.7%	06.2%
Volta	49.8%	08.6%	00.0%	22.8%	07.8%	00.0%	00.7%	00.0%
Eastern	56.6%	12.4%	14.4%	00.0%	00.0%	00.0%	00.5%	00.0%
Asante	58.8%	23.0%	08.6%	00.0%	00.0%	00.0%	03.3%	00.0%
Brong-Ahafo	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Northern	45.1%	00.0%	00.0%	00.0%	00.0%	18.5%	15.1%	00.0%
Upper East	36.4%	00.0%	00.0%	00.0%	00.0%	35.1%	00.0%	00.0%
Upper West	23.7%	00.0%	00.0%	00.0%	00.0%	39.9%	00.0%	00.0%

Note: For Tables 1–4 only parties gaining at least 5 percent of the vote in at least one region are displayed and uncontested races (in this case Wassaw Central, Denkyira, and South Tongu) are scored as a victory of 1–0 for the uncontested candidate. Regions are reported in their contemporary form using constituency lines to divide larger units into contemporary regions. It is impossible to separate Asante Region from Brong-Ahafo Region along constituency lines in 1954 and 1956. It is not possible to separate the Asutifi and Asunafo areas in Brong-Ahafo and Ahafo Ano and Atwima areas in Asante along the present-day regional boundary. An identical problem plagues the boundary between the Asante Region's Ejura Sekyedumase area and Brong-Ahafo's Atebubu/Amantin area. Because of these problematic boundaries, results for these two regions are reported as a single region in preindependence elections.

TABLE 2. 1956 LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY ELECTION RESULTS BY REGION AND ETHNOCULTURAL GROUP

	CPP	NLM	TC	FYO	NoPP	MAP	WAY
Western	84.0%	01.9%	00.0%	00.0%	00.0%	00.0%	09.3%
Central	88.5%	08.9%	00.0%	00.0%	00.0%	00.0%	00.0%
Greater Accra	85.3%	07.8%	00.0%	00.0%	00.0%	04.5%	00.0%
Volta	54.6%	00.0%	20.0%	05.5%	00.0%	00.0%	00.0%
Eastern	68.6%	22.8%	00.0%	01.8%	00.0%	00.0%	00.0%
Asante	43.2%	53.2%	00.0%	00.0%	00.0%	03.4%	00.0%
Brong-Ahafo	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Northern	44.8%	00.0%	00.0%	00.0%	40.5%	03.6%	00.0%
Upper East	52.1%	00.0%	00.0%	00.0%	42.5%	00.0%	00.0%
Upper West	32.0%	00.0%	00.0%	00.0%	68.0%	00.0%	00.0%

Note: Uncontested races were in Amenfi-Aowin, North Birim, Kwahu South, Gonja West, and Dagomba North.

TABLE 3. 1969 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS BY REGION AND ETHNOCULTURAL GROUP

	NAL	PP	UNP	PAP	APRP
Western	16.0%	52.7%	01.0%	20.7%	07.3%
Central	18.5%	71.0%	02.6%	02.0%	05.8%
Greater Accra	35.1%	34.8%	22.0%	03.3%	00.0%
Volta	77.1%	18.1%	03.2%	01.0%	00.1%
Eastern	32.4%	62.3%	01.9%	00.7%	00.6%
Asante	17.3%	77.8%	01.8%	01.0%	00.2%
Brong-Ahafo	14.4%	84.7%	00.9%	00.0%	00.0%
Northern	42.4%	47.8%	02.4%	02.5%	02.6%
Upper East	41.5%	37.9%	04.2%	07.6%	03.3%
Upper West	20.2%	78.7%	01.1%	00.0%	00.0%

Note: Agona Kwabre and South Tongu were uncontested.

TABLE 4. 1979 PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESIDENTIAL (2ND ROUND) ELECTION RESULTS BY REGION AND ETHNOCULTURAL GROUP

| | Parliament | | | | | President (2nd Rd) | |
	PFP	PNP	UNC	ACP	SDF	Owusu (PFP)	Limann (PNP)
Western	19.5%	49.7%	08.9%	18.8%	01.0%	23.2%	76.8%
Central	17.8%	30.9%	07.8%	37.6%	01.6%	29.0%	71.0%
Greater Accra	21.7%	36.0%	29.2%	10.7%	01.7%	27.4%	72.6%
Volta	13.3%	41.9%	32.3%	04.8%	05.9%	14.4%	85.6%
Eastern	31.0%	38.5%	24.3%	04.2%	00.8%	44.2%	55.8%
Asante	47.1%	30.4%	17.7%	02.5%	00.9%	57.6%	42.4%
Brong-Ahafo	50.8%	29.8%	08.8%	01.3%	00.5%	61.7%	38.3%
Northern	31.6%	27.8%	08.1%	02.5%	27.3%	33.8%	66.2%
Upper East	18.2%	54.8%	17.0%	02.2%	04.6%	23.3%	76.7%
Upper West	30.2%	44.8%	11.5%	02.1%	08.3%	28.6%	71.4%

Note: Parliamentary results are used in lieu of first round presidential results for easier comparison to the 1969 results. A comparison of results at the regional level for first round presidential and parliamentary votes show significant overlap. The average difference between a region's parliamentary vote for the PFP and first round vote for Owusu was less than 1.5 percent. For the PNP and Limann this number is just over 1 percent and for UNC parliamentary candidates and Paa Willie the difference was less than 0.5 percent.

ETHNOCULTURAL COLOR KEY FOR TABLES 1–4

Asante	Non-Asante Akan	Ga	Northern	Ewé

Note: "Northern" is a cultural category comprised of Grusi, Mole-Dagbon, Mande, Bimoba, Kokomba, Gonja, and Chokosi speakers. Non-Asante Akan is a variable created by separating the total number of Asante-speakers from the total number of Akan-speakers. Asante, Ewé, and Ga are categories used in the 1960 census. To determine which parties received significantly more support amongst these ethnocultural groups than others a bivariate regression was constructed using the ethnocultural variables as the independent variable and party percentage of the vote in territorial units consistent across the census and elections as the dependent variable. The shaded results denote a significant ($p < 0.05$) bivariate positive correlation for the indicated ethnocultural group and political party.

turns to a search for events that changed the quality of social cleavage/political party interactions and led to the persistent voting patterns we know today. Combing through scholarship on Ghanaian politics one finds a number of anecdotal hypotheses regarding the genesis of the Asante/Ewé politically mobilized cleavage and its relationship to cleavages left politically fallow than can be tested for temporal validity.

Isolating "Freezing Moments"

Preindependence Elections (1951, 1954, and 1956)

Nkrumah and the Convention People's Party's (CPP) message helped them capture the "Self Government Now" position and ride it to large victories in each of the Gold Coast's Legislative Assembly elections. The party averaged 71, 56, and 64 percent of the vote across constituencies in preindependence elections, taking a plurality of seats in the 1951 Legislative Assembly due to the large proportion of "nonpartisan" appointed members and a majority in the popularly elected Legislative Assemblies of 1954 and 1956.[8] Looking geographically at the CPP's electoral strongholds (see Figure 2), one finds a party that did well throughout.


FIGURE 2.
CPP percentage of the vote in preindependence elections.

Despite widespread success, there are disparities within and across elections. CPP candidates earned their easiest victories along the coast. Given the party vanguard's reputation as "tramps in N.T. [Northern Territory] Smocks" and its supporters' stereotyping as "Standard VII leavers" these results are counterintuitive.[9] In general, the closer one gets to the coast the more economically developed the area.[10] Regions that made up Gold Coast Colony, where the CPP gained its best results, claimed 27 percent of their adult populations having some formal schooling in 1960. In Trans-Volta Togoland, Asante Protectorate, and Northern Territories, where the CPP did relatively worse, this number was 26, 20, and 3 percent, respectively.[11]

The maps depicted in Figure 2 treat Danquah-Busiaist parties, a label applied to parties in Ghanaian politics loosely identified as representing the ideological right due to their vigorous opposition to Nkrumah's style of populism and socialist rhetoric, as a residual category for two reasons.[12] J. B. Danquah was the independence era politician who most directly challenged Nkrumah. Born into an Akyem royal family, Danquah was a London-educated lawyer once described by the colonial government as the "doyen of Gold Coast Politics."[13] Danquah's parties and their allies did not do well in preindependence polls, earning no greater than a third of the parliamentary seats in any single election. It is also difficult to definitively identify parties associated with the Danquah-Busiaist tradition during this period. Danquah ran for office under the flags of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), the Ghana Congress Party (GCP), and the National Liberation Movement (NLM). These parties, especially the NLM in 1956, found their strongest support in Asante Region.

Having averaged barely 5 percent of the vote across constituencies in 1951 and earning only two seats in Parliament, UGCC elites settled into an anti-CPP coalition of regional partners for the 1954 and 1956 elections. To the parties of Danquah were joined a party focusing its campaign on the North, the Northern People's Party (NoPP),[14] a party identifying with Ghanaian Muslims, the Moslem Association Party (MAP), and a party concentrating on the Togoland region, the Togoland Congress (TC). These parties rallied around a proposed federal constitution and were decried by Nkrumahists as factions wanting to "destroy national unity."[15]

Observations of ethnic factionalism are a mainstay in Ghanaian political historiographies but do little to accurately describe the results obtained by these early sectional parties. Tables 1 and 2 depict election results for 1954 and 1956 by region. In addition to the raw percentages, these results are color coded based on the major ethnocultural groups that yield a significant positive coefficient when charged with predicting the percentage of party votes in a bivariate regression. Although the regional parties, save for the GCP in 1954, showed an expected relationship with the ethnic and/or cultural groups they purported to represent, a

look at the percentages of these parties' support forces reexamination. The NLM, NoPP, and TC supremacy in their home regions is too often overstated. In the Asante Protectorate, the NLM captured just over 50 percent of the vote whereas the CPP managed more than 40 percent. Even acknowledging the region's ethnic diversity (the 1960 census reports that a third of Asante Region's inhabitants were non-Asante), one cannot credibly interpret these results as descriptive of a politically homogeneous ethnic bloc. The NLM's percentage of the vote's positive correlation with Asante-speakers is as much an effect of the party's lack of support, and failure to run candidates, outside of Asante as it is an effect of popularity among Asante-speakers.

In areas comprising the Northern Territories (Northern, Upper West, and Upper East Regions at present) the NoPP averaged fewer votes than the CPP in both 1954 and 1956. The TC earned its best results in Ewé-speaking areas of Trans-Volta Togoland (Volta Region today) but did not run candidates in the Ewé-speaking coastal areas, ceding these constituencies to the Anlo Youth Organization (AYO) and Federation of Youth Organizations (FYO), and won only two of the four seats in Kpandu and Ho in 1954 and 1956 (the CPP and an independent candidate picked up the remaining seats).

Postindependence Elections before the Fourth Republic (1969 and 1979)

After independence, Nkrumah and the CPP consolidated power transforming Ghana into a de facto, then de jure, one-party state. The military overthrew Nkrumah's government in February 1966 holding elections for the Second Republic in August 1969. Twenty-eight months later this republic was overthrown and after a period of seven years of military rule the Third Republic was inaugurated in 1979, itself to be overthrown after twenty-eight months. For each of these elections the Nkrumahist/Danquah-Busiaist ideological rivalry was revived.

Taking up the mantle of Danquah-Busiaism in 1969 was Kofi Busia and his Progress Party (PP). Busia was an obvious successor to Danquah. He held a doctorate in social anthropology from Oxford and had risen through the political ranks thanks in no small part to the favor he curried with traditional authorities in the Asanteman Council.[16] In 1979, the Danquah-Busiaist camp was split between Victor Owusu's Popular Front Party (PFP) and William Ofori-Atta's United National Convention (UNC). Ofori-Atta laid claim to the Danquah-Busiaist label through his family ties with Danquah, his paternal uncle, and involvement in the UGCC and Owusu through his position as foreign minister in Busia's cabinet.[17]

Nkrumahist parties include the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL), which served as opposition after the 1969 elections, and Hilla Limann's People's National

Party (PNP), which won both the presidency and legislature in 1979. Limann's name was advanced by his uncle, old guard Nkrumahist Imoru Egala, and his party ran openly as "Nkrumahists."[18] The NAL donned the brand more delicately. With the National Liberation Council (NLC) military government hostile to remnants of the old regime, one of Nkrumah's dismissed ministers, Komla Gbedemah, returned home to lead the party but avoided explicit propaganda with Nkrumah's words and likeness during the Second Republic.[19]

In both the 1969 and 1979 elections, Danquah-Busiaist parties added to the NLM's successes in Asante Region (see Figure 3). The PP swept the region in 1969 and the PFP took nineteen of twenty-two available seats in 1979.[20] Apart from this similarity, Danquah-Busiaist electoral maps from 1969 and 1979 diverge in important ways. The 1969 map, which depicts a Danquah-Busiaist victory, shows strong support across Ghana and in Akan-speaking regions in particular. Brong-Ahafo, Busia's birth region, rivals Asante Region in its strength of support and Central and Eastern Regions demonstrate high levels of support as well. The 1979 map, which depicts a Danquah-Busiaist loss, contrasts with the 1969 map in diminished support across almost every region.

What this map does not show is the different bases of support for 1979's two Danquah-Busiaist parties. The UNC earned its best results in Volta, Greater Accra, and non-Akan portions of Eastern Region.[21] The PFP had a better showing in general but demonstrated true mastery in Asante and Brong-Ahafo. A run-off pitting the Nkrumahist Limann against the PFP candidate produced a telling result. Despite the UNC's preelection flirtation with a Danquah-Busiaist merger, election returns suggest that the vast majority of UNC voters preferred the Northern Nkrumahist candidate to a Danquah-Busiaist candidate associated strongly with Asante Region.[22]

The maps of Nkrumahist support in 1969 and 1979 also contrast markedly with their preindependence versions. In neither of these elections did Nkrumahists hold their own in Asante. In addition, there are two noteworthy differences amidst the sea of ambiguously gray areas on these Nkrumahist maps. First, Nzima-speaking constituencies in Ghana's southwest corner remain loyal to Nkrumah, a son of their soil, during his lifetime.[23] Their relationship did not carry over to the NAL in the Second Republic. Because of Gbedemah and the NAL's successes nationally, most scholars pin the Nkrumahist label on them despite not openly running as a Nkrumahist party, but the People's Action Party (PAP) also stood in opposition to the Danquah-Busiaists and made its only significant showing in Nzima-speaking constituencies. The second notable difference is the Nkrumahists' success in their flag bearer's home region. Gbedemah was able to shake Volta Region's relationship with the Danquah-allied TC and move past resentment toward Nkrumah to achieve substantial successes in the area in 1969. Limann, who hailed from

FIGURE 3.
Danquah-Busiaists and Nkrumahists percentage of the vote in pre-
Fourth Republic parliamentary elections.

Sisaalaland, united the Upper Regions in 1979 in an unprecedented way, leading his party to fifteen of the area's sixteen seats.

Looking at these elections with the help of regression analysis reveals a lack of politically mobilized cleavages along geographically based socioeconomic lines.

Unlike Nkrumah's CPP, none of the major parties during this period demonstrate a significant correlation between the percentage of individuals with some formal education in a unit and the percentage of votes garnered. Looking at these elections with an eye for perceived ethnic identities reveals more distinctions (see Tables 3 and 4). The perceived Asante parties (PP in 1969 and PFP in 1979), Ewé parties (NAL in 1969 and UNC in 1979), and Northern party (PNP in 1979) all show significantly better than expected results in units with large numbers of their ethnocultural core.

In 1969 and 1979, the "Asante party" builds on the NLM's success in Asante-speaking constituencies. To win, the PP adds to this base a large percentage of non-Asante Akan voters. This feat is unique in pre-Fourth Republican history. The "Ewé party's" relationship with its base is less consistent. In 1969, the NAL added to its Ewé core a large percentage of the vote in Ga-speaking areas. In the parliamentary and first round of presidential votes in 1979 it is impossible to label the UNC's success in Ewé-speaking areas a landslide but opposition to Owusu in the second round reinvigorated the idea of an Ewé voting bloc. The one perceived "Northern party" to run in these elections was the PNP, which did better in the North than the South in 1979 but also did well enough in the South to take a majority of the legislative seats and the presidency.

The Freezing Process

In Lipset and Rokkan's typology of party systems, revolution is important. Case studies used to illustrate the process of "freezing" are separated into categories based on the type of revolution cleaving society in a politically meaningful way.[24] To fit West Africa into this mold, Wallerstein argued that the region's party systems arose out of independence movements. On one side of the resultant cleavage were the dominant nationalist parties and on the other the colonizers. Independence deprived these cleavage structures of one of their poles and one-party states were the outcome. Wallerstein hoped that class interests would eventually rise to the fore but feared that "tribal differences" would beat class to the punch.[25] What happened to the Ghanaian party system across republics is not so dramatic as the revolutions covered by Lipset and Rokkan, and as the provided maps suggest, Wallerstein's characterization of fledgling party systems in West Africa as monoliths uniformly opposing colonial rule misses some significant areas of contestation. His prediction that class and ethnic cleavages would compete for preeminence after the independence honeymoon is in line with widespread understandings of the competing poles of potentiality in African politics. Each of these cleavage types has, at one time

or another and to varying degrees, been used to describe opposing forces in Ghanaian politics.

Unfortunately, in the ensuing half a century, little has been done to advance our understanding of social cleavage/party system interaction utilizing African cases. A large portion of this regional–theoretical stasis in undoubtedly due to African countries relatively barren past when it comes to competitive multiparty elections. Despite decades of independence, Ghana became the first African country to pass Huntington's "two turnover" as recently as 2008.[26] And even in this relatively consolidated party system, scholars are finding evidence to support competing hypotheses. Lindberg and Morrison, for instance, used a Large N survey to suggest that Ghana's political parties are separated by sectional socioeconomic cleavages contrary to Wallerstein's hypotheses.[27] Fridy, on the other hand, used a Large N survey to find that ethnicity is still a significant factor used to differentiate among Ghana's political parties.[28] Given the comparatively untrod ground of social cleavage/party system interactions, and the nearly virgin territory of social cleavage's role in party-system formation, this article uses Erdmann—nudging toward heuristic use of Lipset and Rokkan's models—to understand African party politics seriously.[29] The case study presented here is used to help people better understand why Ghanaian politics looks the way it does at present with a side project of generating hypotheses about social cleavage and party system formation elsewhere in the region.

Here the Asante/Ewé ethnolinguistic cleavage, for which election results demonstrate to be extremely significant in characterizing electoral politics in Ghana at least at the aggregate level, is traced back to its origins. The events that produced this politically salient cleavage reveal themselves not as a revelatory moment where what was one day fluid is another day frozen. Rather, the politicization of this cleavage occurred through a series of events that construct and reconstruct, frequently completely independent of each other, these opposing political identities. History demonstrates that these poles are not natural or primordial foes. President Kufuor, himself the epitome of the Danquah-Busiaist/Asante admixture, incorporates leaders of the early Togoland unification movement into his list of national heroes.[30] The maps and regressions presented above detail the extent of the transformation of the Asante and Ewé into oppositional cleavage poles and highlight elections of significance but fail to identify the actors, structures, and/or events that drove the process. Without a spectacular revolution on which to pin the blame, three questions are asked of the historical record to supplement the preceding election analysis. What precipitated the formation of the political identities known today as Ewé and Asante? How did these two identities become opposing forces? And what actors, structures, and/or events sustain, redefine, and reinterpret this competition?

Becoming Politically Salient "Groups"

Contemporary political discourse in Ghana gives the impression that Danquah-Busiaism has, from its inception, been entangled with the Asante ethnic identity. This misreading of Ghanaian history ignores election results from 1951 and 1954 where Danquah's parties were beaten soundly on their "home turf." In 1951, the UGCC managed less than 1 percent of the vote in the Asante Protectorate while collecting nearly 6 percent of the vote in the rest of the Gold Coast. The GCP in 1954 did a little better in the Asante Protectorate, capturing nearly 9 percent of the vote there compared to just 3 percent elsewhere. Not until the NLM in 1956 was this status quo of lackluster results altered by the unprecedented galvanizing of Asante-speaking areas under the Danquah-Busiaist umbrella.

Austin identifies the spark of this realignment as Gbedemah's introduction of the 1954 Cocoa Duty and Development Funds Bill.[31] The bill proposed to fix the price of cocoa for four years in the midst of a worldwide price boom.[32] "Like an innocent match flame," reads an editorial, "the strange attitude of the all African CPP Government to the simple demand of farmers for a higher local price of cocoa has gone a long way to threaten to set ablaze the petrol dump of Asante nationalism."[33] In this contentious environment a number of young men once aligned with the CPP launched the NLM. These early organizers were well-versed in CPP populism and felt their potential for private gain had been adversely affected by government policies.[34]

Once initiated, the movement became too big for its founders to control alone and they were joined by disgruntled cocoa farmers, the Asantehene and Asanteman Council, whose traditional power was being challenged by Nkrumah's centralizing tendencies, and leaders of the opposition in search of popular traction.[35] The Asanteman Council was well-placed to serve as symbol of opposition via their predecessors' leadership of the empire's military campaign against the British a half-century prior.[36] Arguing on behalf of these traditional authorities, the opposition in legislature demanded a change in the colonial constitution that would diminish CPP power. The recommended mechanisms for this alteration were twofold: a weak federal system giving more autonomy to the regions and a bicameral legislature with a new upper house composed of "all Chiefs . . . not subordinate to any other Chief."[37] In defense of these demands, Busia wrote: "The strength of national feeling in Ashanti is well known. It was given historic expression during the last century in seven battles against the British. National sentiment in Ashanti is based on a history of which the Ashantis are proud, and on loyalty to the Golden Stool, the symbol of the nation's identity. Any constitution which fails to recognize the identity of the Asante nation will arouse violent

feelings against it."[38] Despite the Asante-centric essence of this rationale, and its crasser variants,[39] the logic reverberated positively with other regional parties.[40]

Sharing an aversion to CPP rule with the NLM, the TC cause relied on a different set of historical and cultural claims. The concept of "Togoland," unlike Asante, is not built on a precolonial historical precedent. Rather, Togoland is understood as a residue of the colonial experiment carved out by Germany during Europe's scramble for Africa. Togoland's first colonization was brief and shallow. In 1890, there were only 12 German officials in Togoland; by World War I there were fewer than 400.[41] With Germany's defeat in the Great War, the League of Nations divvied up responsibilities for administering their territories. France took responsibility for 60 percent of the territory inhabited by 80 percent of the Togolese population and Britain accepted Togoland's western flank.[42]

Like political movements in the Gold Coast, forces that defined the late colonial period in Togoland came to the fore in the late 1940s with designs of forging independence. These proto-parties can be placed into two categories based on the form of Togoland desired.[43] The first wanted to unite Ewé-speaking territories into a coherent political unit, a notion unimagined in the precolonial era.[44] The second type sought the reunification of German Togoland. This latter definition of the project excluded Peki, Anlo, Some, Tongu, and Klikor Ewés in the Gold Coast and Fon-speakers in Dahomey but added to the remaining Ewé-speakers their non-Ewé neighbors living to the north. By jettisoning Gold Coast Ewés, and to a lesser extent Dahomian Fons, this understanding of Togoland cleared two significant hurdles. It assuaged the fears of many inland Ewés of being dominated by the wealthier and better educated Gold Coast Ewés and brought the region's demands under the purview of the United Nations.[45] The desire for reunification of German Togoland brought with it a major stumbling block as well. Dagomba and Mamprusi ethnic communities living in Northern Togoland would be separated from the numerically larger Dagomba and Mamprusi ethnic communities in Britain's colony.[46]

This latter course, with its strengths and weaknesses, was the course championed by TC.[47] Election results from 1951 and 1954 go some way in explaining why the TC's opposition to Nkrumah, which was not designed as an Ewé movement, would come by many to be seen as closely associated with the Ewé as the NLM was with Asante. Volta Region contains the majority of Ghanaian Ewé-speakers and Ewé-speakers make up a majority of Volta Region's population. TC ran its only candidates in this region though it steered clear of the Gold Coast Colony Ewé areas leaving them to the AYO in 1954 and FYO in 1956.[48] When a plebiscite was put to the residents of British Togoland this pattern repeated itself. Asked if they favored integration with the Gold Coast Colony or separation, Ho and Kpandu, the two majority Ewé districts, voted 62 percent in favor of separation

whereas the Buem-Krachi, Gonja, Dagomba, and Mamprusi Districts voted for integration.[49]

The threat these regional parties posed to CPP dominance was localized and modest. When one speaks of NLM's use of Asante's unique historical relationship with the British or TC's use of Togoland's unique legal position in relation to the Gold Coast Colony, one is not speaking of processes resulting in homogenous ethnopolitical blocs. CPP either came close to, or bested, the vote totals of these regional parties among their core Asante and Ewé voters. Rather, one is speaking of processes resulting in the successful creation of parties that became identifiable to the electorate, fairly or unfairly, based on the ethnic groups that dared challenge CPP authority in an environment where political parties were being pigeon-holed by the ruling party as either nationalizing (good) or sectionalist (bad).

Making and Sustaining Politically Salient Ethnic Rivalries

Electoral fortunes for regional parties changed with Nkrumah's exit. As scholars predicted, ethnicity took a more focal role in the political discourse. Ghanaians did not have to wait long for charges of "tribalism." Military and police forces that overthrew Nkrumah were led by three Ewé officers (Kotoka, Harlley, and Deku) and two Akans (Afrifa, an Asante, and Okran, a Fante). To round out the lot, two Gas (Ankrah and Nunoo) and a Northerner (Yakubu) were included in the NLC with Ankrah taking up the post as Head of the Council.[50] Careful ethnic arithmetic was thrown into disequilibrium when Kotoka was killed in April 1967. "[R]umours that the attempted coup was an insurrection planned by Asantes and Fantes against Ewes and Gas," Ankrah tried to clear the record, "were wicked and absolutely untrue."[51] This public appeal was prompted by popular claims that the NLC was trying to pack the public sector with Ga- and Ewé-speakers.[52] By April 1969, however, Ankrah had been expelled from government for preparing a campaign to contest upcoming elections.[53] Nunoo fought to keep Ankrah and was himself removed from office.[54] With Afrifa at the helm of state, and civilians the likes of Busia and Owusu serving as high profile advisors, what was once characterized as an Ewé and Ga coup suddenly looked remarkably like an Akan governing council.

This reconstituted ethnic arrangement figured heavily into the 1969 campaign. "Ethnic rivalry was never openly proclaimed as a 'good thing,'" noted Brown, "but condemnations of tribalism gave way to benign neglect and there was widespread public knowledge of Africa's campaign against the Ewé, Gbedemah, and his support for his fellow Asante, Busia; of Harlley's support for Gbedemah; and of Ankrah's support, until his dismissal, of Alex Hutton-Mills and other Ga politicians."[55]

Election results reflect these divisions with Busia's PP establishing what Chazan called the "grand Akan alliance of 1969" and Gbedemah and the NAL cobbling together a coalition from Ewé and Ga-speaking areas.[56] Bit players also had their ethnic strongholds with the United National Party (UNP), PAP, and the All People's Republican Party (APRP) polling best in Ga, Nzima, and Fante-speaking constituencies, respectively. Only in the North could the electorate be characterized as relatively evenly divided between Danquah-Busiaist and Nkrumahist parties.

To the victor's base went the cabinet spoils. Though Busia condemned "tribalism" in speeches, his cabinet selections were noticeably lopsided.[57] In a cabinet of nineteen, Busia tapped fourteen Akans (five Asante, two Brong, three Akim, one Fante, and three others), one Ga, three Northerners, and one Guan.[58] The government was accused of standing in the way of Ewé appointments and promotions and dismissing Ewés disproportionately from the civil service in operation "Apollo 568," wherein 568 civil servants were laid off without explanation. Gbedemah, the most prominent Ewé politician of the day, was not allowed his seat in Parliament because of ties to Nkrumah's government. Then government passed the 1969 Aliens Compliance Order, which was directed largely at Ewé communities along the border.[59] Whether or not these actions were political payback or coincidence, they were noticed by the opposition and painted in ethnic terms.

Instead of a nationalist party dominating several parochial parties, this first postindependence election was defined by competition between ethnically tinged blocs. "Of all the highly significant cleavages of modern Ghana," Rothchild writes in reference to this period between the Second and Third Republics, "none is more salient than that of ethnicity."[60] Into this context of distrust stepped the National Redemption Council (NRC). Though the flagging economy was the coup's public raison d'être, Acheampong justified his regime in part as a response to Busia's handling of Ghana's pluralistic society. "[W]ith the blood of the millions of our Nigerian brothers to warn us," Acheampong cautioned, "I acted to nip the threat in the bud."[61] Political parties of both the Nkrumahist and Danquah-Busiaist molds were banned and the word "tribe" was expunged from official documents to "eliminate divisive and tribal forces which militate against national unity and progress."[62]

The NRC, and its replacement the Supreme Military Council (SMC), complemented these policies with ethnoregional balancing.[63] In Volta Region there was a brief and unpopular flirtation with the idea of reinvigorating the TC cause that did little to excite the masses of Volta Region while simultaneously giving the government useful ammunition to spread concern about Ewé secessionists to bolster support for military rule in other regions.[64] When it came to Acheampong's pet project however, a government comprised of military and civilian components

(UNIGOV), it was from allied Asante and Ewé-speaking areas that the regime received its staunchest opposition.[65]

After the military respite, the election campaign of 1979 reinvigorated the animosity fostered in the run-up to the Second Republic and fomented under the Busia regime. *Africa* characterized the elections as pitting "Yesterday's Men" against "the Day Before Yesterday's Men." When focusing on social cleavages instead of ideological monikers, this description is only half right. Owusu and the PFP had the bona fides to trace their political lineage through the Danquah-Busiaist PP and NLM. Owusu is an Asante who served in Busia's government and his primary challenger, J. H. Mensah, was a Busia finance minister hailing from Sunyani.[66] PFP candidates railed against Nkrumah just as Busia had done a decade prior. For them Nkrumah's reign meant market shortages and political detentions. "It's no good saying it will never happen again," read a party advertisement, "some of it did under Acheampong, and that it even might happen again should be sufficient cause for us not to risk it at all."[67]

Limann and the PNP had the personnel to lay claim to the Nkrumahist mantle. The party's founders, Imoru Egala and Kojo Botsio, were CPP cabinet members well-versed in Nkrumahism. "The Party," read the PNP manifesto, "believes that the ideas and ideals for which the late President Kwame Nkrumah stood, provide the best guidelines, the pursuit of which will enable it to achieve its aims and objectives for the good of all Ghanaians."[68] Unlike the CPP government or NAL opposition, however, the PNP had a distinctively Northern character. Though the party's ranks were ethnically heterogeneous comprised mostly of individuals from smaller groups outside the Asante/Ewé constellation, Egala, a Northerner from Tumu, was known to be the money behind the PNP, and his candidate for president had run for office only once before as a Danquah-aligned NoPP candidate.[69] The UNC, which aligned with the PNP in government and for the purposes of the presidential run-off, has been pigeon-holed ideologically as 1979's second Danquah-Busiaist party due to Ofori-Atta's personal history. Yet its social base in terms of ethnic strongholds resembled that of a watered-down NAL, which contributed Obed Asamoah and Sam Okudzeto to UNC leadership.[70]

When the confusion of having three major parties settled into a two-horse race pitting Owusu against Limann, the Danquah-Busiaist PFP candidate was similar to both the PP and NLM in relying on Asante-speaking areas to form his electoral core. The PNP precluded an Akan coalition by beating Owusu to the punch in Western and Central Regions with early selections of high-profile representatives from the areas.[71] Calling Ewés "inward looking" in response to criticism of Busia from an NAL member of parliament, Owusu sealed his fate in areas that would have been difficult going anyway.[72] Owusu's remarks made it easy for the PNP to pin the label "Popular Fronts for Plunder and Tribalism" on the PFP and make it

stick in areas where UNC-via-NAL voters found the ideological barrier separating Danquah-Busiaism from Nkrumahism permeable.[73]

When Jerry Rawlings and the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) overthrew Limann on the last day of 1981, the action was described by those looking favorably on the coup as a redress for the men in uniform harassed by the PNP or as a corrective measure for the corruption that was rampant and at least tacitly accepted by Limann.[74] Those looking at the PNDC regime with distaste saw the extra-parliamentary action as a power grab by soldiers who had not gotten their fill of state resources.[75] Neither camp characterized the coup as ethnically motivated. Limann assembled a fairly representative cabinet and had an economic record marked not by regional favoritism, but by countrywide malaise. The early PNDC regime was also regionally balanced.[76]

Over time, allegations of ethnic favoritism in the PNDC increased. Adu Boahen accused Rawlings of "wittingly or unwittingly, consciously or unconsciously . . . fanning ethnicity, or as it is more popularly though wrongly termed, tribalism" for giving high-profile positions to individuals from Volta Region.[77] K. Ansa Asamoa, a PNDC ideologue from the University of Cape Coast, fired back with a complaint that previous regimes, both military and civilian, had been dominated by Akan-speakers. This familiar ethnopolitical dialogue gave way to familiar "ideological" divisions in the Fourth Republic. The "Danquah-Busia Club" existed prior to legalization of political parties and was transformed into the NPP nearly whole cloth.[78] Rawlings, who is often portrayed as blazing a third path because of his populist rhetoric and neoliberal structural adjustment programs, does not shy away from Nkrumah comparisons.[79] The NDC's tremendous strength in Volta Region does not hearken back to Nkrumah, however, but rather to the NAL, UNC, and PNP parties from the Second and Third Republics.

Conclusion

Answers to the two guiding questions of this article are not parsimonious. The Ghanaian party system's "freezing moment" can best be described as a series of fits and starts, many of which only appear significant in hindsight. Asante, as a modern political identity, was first mobilized through the NLM but this mobilization was far from total. It was the PP that solidified this ethnoregional bloc in 1969. The modern Ewé identity arose as a "common knowledge" stereotype before it became a political reality. Ewé speakers living outside of the area formerly known as Togoland make up more than half of Ghanaian Ewés and were in general antithetical to the TC's aims of secession.[80] With the highly "tribalized" atmosphere that followed Nkrumah's overthrow, ambitions of the TC were used to "scapegoat"

Ghanaian Ewés and Ewé-speaking areas returned the favor by heavily backing a perceived "Ewé party" against an "Akan party" in the 1969 election.[81] The 1979 elections reconfirmed the Asante ethnic group's relationship with Danquah-Busiaist parties but showed Ewé voters not to be particularly enamored with Nkrumahism, but antithetical to the cause of Asante politicians who many felt would not treat their region fairly based on perceptions of past experience. This reading of Ghanaian sociopolitical history stands in stark contrast to a contemporary assumption that Ghana's two largest ethnic groups, Asante and Ewé voters, have been at odds since time immemorial.

Those "free agents" in Ghanaian politics who fall outside of this convenient dichotomy are much harder to compartmentalize into an electoral pattern. Northern regions are heterogeneous both ethnically and politically throughout the pre-Fourth Republican period. Though regions populated by large numbers of Ga and non-Asante Akan voters have toyed with the idea of voting as a bloc, these effects do not carry over from election to election. For observers of elections in the Fourth Republic, these traits are well-known even if not understood as historical legacies. Notions of a socioeconomic cleavage dividing Ghana's North from its South or an all-encompassing ethnolinguistic cleavage separating Akans and non-Akans depend on these "free agents" lining up predictably in one political bloc or another. Although Nkrumah's CPP and Busia's PP were able to more or less unite one side of these potentially all-encompassing cleavages, well-educated Southerners in the former and Akans in the latter, the other side never congealed thanks in large part to non-Asante and non-Ewé voters' inability and/or unwillingness to conform to the politics behind these cleavages.

So, what does this nuanced story mean for the literature on the relationship between social cleavages and political parties in general? In many ways, this story is uniquely Ghanaian. Though Asantes and Ewés inhabit areas outside of Ghana, in no other country do they exist in large enough quantities to constitute the two poles of a national party system. The fact that Asantes are Ghana's largest recognized ethnic group (making up about 15 percent of the population) and Ewé's are the second largest (approximately 13 percent of the population) is not unimportant and could provide fodder for comparisons with other countries similarly divided. Still the Asantes' antagonistic relationship with the British and the Ewés' division by the Ghana/Togo-via-British/French-via-German/British border are important factors unlikely to be replicated elsewhere. Nevertheless, the Ghanaian case informs scholarship on the relationship between social cleavages and party systems in the way it took shape without a grand bifurcating revolution. Wallerstein predicted that ethnic rivalries would color the independence period, save for some divine intervention by national leaders and a relatively rapid project of modernization. Yet in Ghana there has been no Biafra moment. Unique historical

circumstances and social structures contributed to two politicized ethnic identities, but the rest of Ghana, which serves as home to the vast majority of voters, has worked around this dichotomy instead of joining into larger mutually exclusive cultural blocs.

NOTES

1. Kevin S. Fridy, "The Elephant, Umbrella, and Quarelling Cocks: Disaggregating Partisanship in Ghana's Fourth Republic," *African Affairs* 106, no. 423 (2007): 281–305; Paul Nugent, "Living in the Past: Urban, Rural and Ethnic Themes in the 1992 and 1996 Elections in Ghana," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 37, no. 2 (1999): 287–319.

2. Kevin S. Fridy, "Where Are Ghana's Swing Voters? A Look at the Voters Responsible for Altering Power in One of Africa's Most Successful Democracies," *Africa Review* 4, no. 2 (2012): 107–21.

3. Nugent, "Living in the Past"; Fridy, "The Elephant, Umbrella, and Quarelling Cocks"; Richard Asante and E. Gyimah-Boadi, *Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance of the Public Sector in Ghana* (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2004); Staffan I. Lindberg and Minion K. C. Morrison, "Are African Voters Really Ethnic or Clientelistic? Survey Evidence from Ghana," *Political Science Quarterly* 123, no. 1 (2008): 95–122; Nahomi Ichino and Noah L. Nathan, "Crossing the Line: Local Ethnic Geography and Voting in Ghana," *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 2 (2013): 344–61.

4. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives* (New York: Free Press, 1967).

5. A list of such texts would include: Dennis Austin, *Politics in Ghana, 1946–1960* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964); David E Apter, *Ghana in Transition* (New York: Atheneum, 1963); Robert Pinkney, *Ghana under Military Rule, 1966–1969* (London: Methuen, 1972); Donald Rothchild, "Military Regime Performance: An Appraisal of the Ghana Experience, 1972–1978," *Comparative Politics* 12, no. 4 (1980): 459–79; Naomi Chazan, *An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics: Managing Political Recession, 1969–1982* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983); E. Gyimah-Boadi, "Ghana Under PNDC Rule" (Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA, 1993); and Paul Nugent, *Big Men, Small Boys, and Politics in Ghana: Power, Ideology, and the Burden of History, 1982–1994* (New York: Pinter, 1995).

6. Source material for the election results are as follows: 1951 [Government of the Gold Coast, "Gold Coast Gazette Extraordinary (January 29)" (Accra, Gold Coast: British National Archives, 1951); Government of the Gold Coast, "Gold Coast Gazette Extraordinary (February 14)" (Accra, Gold Coast: British National Archives, 1951); "General Election Results: C. P. P. Scrubs the Polls in Ghana's First General Election," *Ashanti Pioneer*, 1951.]; 1954 [Jon Kraus Ghana Election Archive, "Report on the Gold Coast General Election 1954,"

1954; S N Addo, "64 C.P.P. 'Rebels' Are Expelled," *Daily Graphic*, 1954.]; 1956 [Jon Kraus Ghana Election Archive, "General Election 1956," 1956; "Victory for the C.P.P.," *West Africa*, 1956.]; 1969 [Government of Ghana, "Results of the General Elections," *Ghana Gazette*, 1969; Jon Kraus Ghana Election Archive, "General Election Results August, 1969," 1969; "Election Special," *Daily Graphic*, 1969.]; and 1979 [Ivan Addae-Mensah, "Election 1979," *Legon Observer*, 1979; Emmanuel Doe Ziorklui, "Ghana: Election Results 1951–2000" (Accra, Ghana: Em-Zed, 2002).].] Results depicted in the maps are only for legislative elections since only the 1979 contest had a separate presidential contest.

7. Prior to the Fourth Republic, censuses were conducted in 1948, 1960, 1970, and 1984. Unfortunately, questions from census to census are inconsistent. The question of ethnicity was broached in 1960 but disappeared from censuses until 2000 because of controversy. Though 1948, 1960, and 1970 censuses ask questions about school attendance, a useful abstraction for social class, the report from 1984 is a mere head count. In addition, these censuses use different aggregated reporting units. Because 1960 is the most complete census, data presented in this article comes from there. In order to make these census units of analysis compatible with electoral constituencies some units had to be merged. The end result was fifty units varying in size from 32,680 to 491,820 residents. Results are reported in these units. B. Gil, A. F. Aryee, and D. K. Ghansah, *1960 Population Census of Ghana*, Special Report (Accra, Ghana: Census Office, 1964).

8. Two caveats must be attached to these results. In 1951, Northern Territories were not allowed a partisan vote and in 1954 there were sixty-four "rebels" expelled from the CPP, many of whom ran as independents and averaged 12 percent of the vote per seat. "Was Secrecy a Mistake in the North?," *West Africa*, March 10, 1951, 197–8; Addo, "64 C.P.P. 'Rebels' Are Expelled."

9. These pejorative labels were intended by critics to identify Nkrumah's support as being drawn from the less sophisticated circles of Ghanaian society, but the populist politician reveled in the disparagement. Austin, *Politics in Ghana,* 212.

10. Using the Wroclaw Taxonomic Technique, Ewusi ranks each of the regions that made up Gold Coast Colony (Western, Central, Eastern, and Greater Accra) as more developed than any other region. Kodwo Ewusi, "Disparities in Levels of Regional Development in Ghana," *Social Indicators Research* 3, no. 1 (1976): 75–100.

11. A bivariate regression using the CPP's percentage of the vote as the dependent variable and the percentage of people in the units described in the key to Tables 1–4 who are over the age of six and attended at least some school as the independent variable substantiates this reading of the maps. In 1954, this regression yields a coefficient (standard error) of .701 (.218) with a significance of .002. In 1956, the results are .459 (.252) with a significance of .074.

12. For more on this tradition see H. B. Martinson, *Ghana—The Dream of the 21st Century: Politics of J. B. Danquah, Busia and Kufuor Tradition* (Accra, Ghana: Norcento Press, 2001). Though pundits in Ghana regularly introduce the term

"Danquah-Busia" as a synonym for "neo-liberal," as Pinkney perceptively notes: "['ideology'] appears to have been important in welding the party together as a vote-winning and activist-winning machine, but as a guide to policy it had little to offer." Robert Pinkney, "Ghana: An Alternating Military/Party System," in *Political Parties in the Third World*, ed. Vicky Randall (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1988), 48.

13. Henry Kwasi Akyeampong and Joseph Boakye Danquah, "The Doyen Speaks: Some of the Historic Speeches by Dr. J. B. Danquah" (Accra, Ghana: West African Graphic, 1956).

14. NoPP is used as the abbreviation for the Northern People's Party instead of the more familiar NPP to differentiate the pre-Fourth Republican party from the contemporary New Patriotic Party.

15. Select Committee of the Legislative Council, "Report on Federalism and Second Chamber," *Select Committee* (Accra, Ghana: British National Archives, 1955), 378.

16. Alex Kwaku Danso-Boafo, *The Political Biography of Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia* (Accra, Ghana: Ghana Universities Press, 1996), 27.

17. Richard Jeffries, "The Ghanaian Elections of 1979," *African Affairs* 79, no. 319 (1980): 397–414.

18. Ivan Addae-Mensah, *Limann and Ghana: The Ideological Question* (Accra, Ghana: People's National Party, 1981); Jon Kraus, "Responses to Party Failures in Ghana," in *When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations*, ed. Kay Lawson and Peter H Merkl (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 479.

19. For Nkrumah's side of this dispute, see "The Truth about Komla Gbedemah" (Ivor Wilks-Phyllis Fergusson Collection of Material on Ghana No. 13, n.d.). For Gbedemah's side, see K. A. Gbedemah, "It Will Not Be 'Work and Happiness for All': An Open Letter Being Also an Appeal to Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and Comment on and Criticism of the Proposed 7 Year Ghana Development Plan" (Ivor Wilks-Phyllis Fergusson Collection of Material on Ghana No. 14, 1962).

20. Today Ghana has ten regions. In 1954, Ghana had four. The only two contemporary regions that cannot be drawn out of the 1954 data are Asante and Brong-Ahafo. Unlike the other eight regions, the boundary dividing Asante and Brong-Ahafo did not run along constituency lines. In this article, "Asante" refers to the Asante/Brong-Ahafo conglomerate when speaking of preindependence elections and Asante Region when speaking of postindependence elections.

21. With the exception of the area around Aflao, where the UNC earned its best results, this support manifested itself as a second-place finish to the PNP with approximately one-third of the vote.

22. Stuart Sutton-Jones, "Ghana: Yesterday's Men vs. the Day Before Yesterday's Men," *Africa*, no. 91 (1979): 15.

23. This loyalty has been carried into the Fourth Republic with the contemporary CPP scoring its greatest victories in Nzima-speaking constituencies.

24. Lipset and Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*.

25. Immanuel Wallerstein, "Class, Tribe, and Party in West African Politics," in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (New York: Free Press, 1967), 511.

26. The two-turnover test is Huntington's benchmark for consolidated democracy. After two peaceful turnovers in power via the ballot box, Huntington argues, the likelihood of going from democracy to nondemocracy is slim. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 267.

27. Lindberg and Morrison, "Are African Voters Really Ethnic or Clientelistic?"

28. Fridy, "The Elephant, Umbrella, and Quarelling Cocks."

29. Gero Erdmann, "The Cleavage Model, Ethnicity and Voter Alignment in Africa: Conceptual and Methodological Problems Revisited," Legitimacy and Efficiency of Political Systems Working Paper (Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2007), 63.

30. Paul Nugent, *Smugglers, Secessionists and Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Toga Frontier: The Life of the Borderlands since 1914* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002), 230. As Nugent points out, a leader of the Togoland Congress is not synonymous with being Ewé (189). Even if one focuses only on the southern section of the Volta Region, there are a number of small ethnic groups known collectively as the Central Togo minorities. Though these groups tend to insist on their cultural uniqueness locally, in national politics they regularly adopt the approach of "ethnicity by approximation." Paul Nugent, "'A Few Lesser Peoples': The Central Togo Minorities and Their Ewe Neighbours," in *Ethnicity in Ghana: The Limits of Invention*, ed. Carola Lentz and Paul Nugent (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 163.

31. Austin, *Politics in Ghana, 1946–1960*, 253–54.

32. The CPP government argued that this policy would curb inflationary pressures and aid development. In practice much of the revenue went into relatively unproductive projects favored by party members. T. Peter Omari, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Anatomy of an African Dictatorship* (New York: Africana Publishing, 1970), 59–60.

33. Jean Marie Allman, "The Youngmen and the Porcupine: Class, Nationalism and Asante's Struggle for Self-Determination, 1954–57," *Journal of African History* 31, no. 2 (1990): 266.

34. Richard Rathbone, "Businessmen and Politics: Party Struggle in Ghana, 1949–1957," *Journal of Development Studies* 9, no. 3 (1973): 390–401; and Allman, "The Youngmen and the Porcupine." On other points relating to the NLM, Rathbone and Allman are not of the same mind. See Richard Rathbone, "Discussion: 'The Youngmen and the Porcupine,'" *Journal of African History* 32, no. 2 (1991): 333–38.

35. Austin, *Politics in Ghana*, 264.

36. Robert B. Edgerton, *The Fall of the Asante Empire: The Hundred-Year War for Africa's Gold Coast* (New York: Free Press, 1995).

37. National Liberation Movement and Its Allies, "Proposals for a Federal Constitution for an Independent Gold Coast and Togoland" (Accra, Ghana: British National Archives, 1955).

38. Kofi Abrefa Busia, "Gold Coast's Future: Securing a Happy Independence," *The Times (London)*, 1956.

39. The crasser version of the argument is illustrated in the statement from an Asante kente weaver recorded during the 1969 campaign. "If the British had not come," he complains, "the Ashanti would have taken over the whole country." Maxwell Owusu, "Politics in Swedru," in *Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana, 1966–1972*, ed. Dennis Austin and Robin Luckham (London: Frank Cass, 1975), 259.

40. The NLM's constitutional demands were cosigned by representatives of the Asanteman Council, NoPP, TC, AYO, MAP, GCP, and GNP.

41. D. E. K. Amenumey, *The Ewe Unification Movement: A Political History* (Accra, Ghana: Ghana Universities Press, 1989).

42. William Roger Louis, "Great Britain and the African Peace Settlement of 1919," *American Historical Review* 71, no. 3 (1966): 886.

43. In addition to the two categories described here, there was a group early on in the imagining process that desired a Togoland that merged British and French Togoland as well as Ewé-speaking areas of the Gold Coast Colony. "The Ewe Question: A Problem the Coussey Committee Missed," *West Africa*, February 3, 1951, 80.

44. Dennis Austin, "The Uncertain Frontier: Ghana-Togo," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 1, no. 2 (1963): 141; Nugent, *Smugglers, Secessionists and Loyal Citizens*, 168–69.

45. "The Ewe Question: Governments Offer Ointment for the Wound," *West Africa*, February 10, 1951, 103; "The Ewe Question: Another Kind of Nationalism in the Gold Coast," *West Africa*, February 17, 1951, 127.

46. Amenumey, *The Ewe Unification Movement*, 172–73.

47. The All Ewé Conference made the case for Ewé unification but never submitted candidates for the Legislative Assembly. The movement was undercut by the United Nations's reluctance to consider adjustments to international boundaries. Amenumey, *The Ewe Unification Movement*, 136.

48. Ewé areas that were never in German Togoland were opposed to unification of the two Togos. Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, "Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance," 24.

49. Nugent, *Smugglers, Secessionists and Loyal Citizens*, 190.

50. Jon Kraus, "The Men in Charge," *Africa Report* 11, no. 4 (1966): 16–20.

51. Morre Bossman, "Tribalism in Ghana?," *Legon Observer* 2, no. 15 (1967): 20–21.

52. Dennis Austin, *Ghana Observed: Essays on the Politics of a West African Republic* (New York: Africana Publishing, 1976), 125.

53. Ankrah eventually joined Joe Appiah's United Nationalist Party (UNP).

54. Robert Dowse, "Military and Police Rule," in *Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana, 1966–1972*, ed. Dennis Austin and Robin Luckham (London: Frank Cass, 1975), 31.

55. David Brown, "Who Are the Tribalists? Social Pluralism and Political Ideology in Ghana," *African Affairs* 81, no. 322 (1982): 56.

56. Naomi Chazan, "Ethnicity and Politics in Ghana," *Political Science Quarterly* 97, no. 3 (1982): 476.

57. Eben Quarcoo, "Busia Promises Fair Deal For All Regions," *Daily Graphic*, September 4, 1969, 16.

58. Danso-Boafo, *The Political Biography of Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia*, 100. According to the 1960 census, Akans made up approximately 45 percent of the Ghanaian population. In 2000, this number approached 50 percent. Either way, by making his cabinet 74 percent Akan, Busia was disregarding the idea of ethnic balance.

59. Brown, "Who Are the Tribalists?," 59.

60. Donald Rothchild, "Ethnicity and Purposive Depoliticization: The Public Policies of Two Ghanaian Military Regimes" (paper, African Studies Association, 21st Annual Meeting, 1978), 1.

61. David Smock and Ann Smock, *The Politics of Pluralism: A Comparative Study of Lebanon and Ghana* (New York: Elsevier Scientific, 1975), 249.

62. Chazan, "Ethnicity and Politics in Ghana," 464.

63. The NRC was comprised of seven Akans, four Ewés, two Northerners, and one Ga. SMC leadership included four Akans, three Ewés, and one Ga with no Northerners. Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, "Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance," 74.

64. David Brown, "Borderline Politics in Ghana: The National Liberation Movement of Western Togoland," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 18, no. 4 (1980): 575–609.

65. Naomi Chazan and Victor T. Le Vine, "Politics in a 'Non-Political' System: The March 30, 1978 Referendum in Ghana," *African Studies Review* 22, no. 1 (1979): 1989.

66. Sutton-Jones, "Ghana," 13.

67. "Before You Vote or Decide Not to Vote Please Read This Page," *Daily Graphic*, July, 7, 1979, 4.

68. People's National Party, "Manifesto of the People's National Party" (Accra, Ghana, 1979), 3.

69. Egala won the Tumu seat for the CPP in 1954 by defeating his nephew, Limann.

70. Chazan, *An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics: Managing Political Recession, 1969–1982*, 287.

71. Limann continued this inclusion selecting eight Akan-speakers for fourteen cabinet spots.

72. Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, "Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance of the Public Sector in Ghana," 73.

73. Sylvester Kane, "Ghana's Political Scene: Here Is the Truth," *Daily Graphic*, July 7, 1979, 6.

74. Kojo Yankah, *The Trial of J.J. Rawlings: Echoes of the 31st December Revolution* (Tema, Ghana: Ghana Publishing Corp., 1986); Kevin Shillington, *Ghana and the*

Rawlings Factor (Singapore: MacMillan, 1992). Acheampong was overthrown by his own men in July 1978. They accused him of running a "one-man show" and initiated plans to install a civilian government by the following summer. Rawlings and a group of junior officers calling themselves the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) overthrew the SMC II government on June 4, 1979 to conduct a "house cleaning" exercise. Before they handed power to civilians in September, all living former military heads of state (Afrifa, Acheampong, and Akuffo) were executed.

75. A Adu Boahen, *The Ghanaian Sphinx: Reflections on the Contemporary History of Ghana, 1972–1987* (Accra, Ghana: Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1989).

76. Although Ewé speakers were overrepresented in the various PNDC cabinets, at no time was Rawlings's PNDC cabinet comprised of more than 28.6 percent Ewés. Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, "Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance of the Public Sector in Ghana," 77.

77. Boahen, *The Ghanaian Sphinx: Reflections on the Contemporary History of Ghana, 1972–1987*, 53.

78. Kwesi Jonah, "Political Parties and the Transition to Multi-Party Politics in Ghana," in *Ghana: Transition to Democracy*, ed. Kwame A Ninsin (Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA, 1998), 92.

79. Jay Oelbaum, "Ethnicity Adjusted? Economic Reform, Elections, and Tribalism in Ghana's Fourth Republic," *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 42, no. 2 (2004): 262–64.

80. The actual number of Ewés residing in the former Gold Coast Colony, British Togoland, and French Togoland is contested. For estimates, see B W Hodder, "The Ewe Problem: A Reassessment," in *Essays in Political Geography*, ed. Charles A. Fisher (London, UK: Methuen & Co., 1968).

81. This line of reasoning is suggested by Brown, "Who Are the Tribalists? Social Pluralism and Political Ideology in Ghana."

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